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The  resource-based  view  of  the Jirm is  a  recent  strategic  management  theory  that  seeks  to 
identify the  resources  that  may  provide firms with  a  sustainable  competitive  advantage.  This 
paper has  two purposes.  First,  the  paper  relates  strategic  management arguments to  parallel 
lines  of  reasoning in  industrial  organization theory  and  argues  that  strategic  regulation  is  a 
major  source  of  sustainable  competitive  advantage.  The  second  purpose  of  the  paper  is  to 
report the  results of an empirical test of the  resource-based theory on the basis of a longitudinal 
data set  on  the  postwar history  of the  Dutch audit  industry. A  key determinant of  this  history 
proves  to be  strategic  regulation, which stimulates demand for audit services and protects  rent- 
producing  resources. 
INTRODUCTION 
For  about  a  decade, the resource-based  view  of 
the firm  has been  promoted as a unifying theory 
of  strategy  (starting  with  Wernerfelt,  1984).  It 
seeks  to  bridge  the  gap  between  theories  of 
internal  organizational  capabilities  on  the  one 
hand  and  external  competitive  strategy  theories 
on the other hand. From the perspective of  theory 
formulation, the record of the resource-based view 
is  impressive  indeed.  The  question  now  is 
whether the theory can stimulate progress on the 
empirical research agenda, where few systematic 
studies have  been  reported.  This paper tests key 
hypotheses from the resource-based theory  using 
a longitudinal data set covering the history of  the 
Dutch  industry  (with  a  focus  on  the  1967-90 
period).  Because  of  data  limitations, the  paper 
deals  with  the  group  and  industry  level  only. 
The findings appear to support the theory’s core 
predictions.  The  paper  is  organized as  follows. 
The second section briefly introduces the theoreti- 
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cal  framework  by  exploring the  complementary 
nature of  the resource-based and industrial organi- 
zation theories. The third section summarizes the 
postwar history and a number of essential features 
of  the  Dutch  audit  industry.  The  fourth  section 
develops  two  hypotheses  and  two  conjectures. 
The  fifth  section  reports  the  results  from  the 
empirical tests. The final section is an  appraisal, 
including  a  number  of  alternative  explanations 
for the empirical results. 
A  RESOURCE-BASED THEORY OF 
THE FIRM,  GROUP AND INDUSTRY 
The resource-based view of  the firm  is a mixture 
of  theories.  Wernerfelt  (1984)  concludes  his 
introduction of  this  ‘new’  view  by  arguing  that 
‘[tlhis  paper  has  attempted to  look  at  firms in 
terms  of  their  resources  rather  than  in  terms 
of  their  products.  It  was  conjectured  that  this 
perspective would throw a different light on stra- 
tegic options, especially those open to  diversified 
firms. Resource position barriers were defined as 
partially analogous to entry barriers’ (Wernerfelt, 
1984: 179). So  far, this view has focused on  two 
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issues  in  particular  (Barney,  1991; Grant,  1991; 
Connor, 199  1 ;  Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Amit 
and  Schoemaker,  1993; Peteraf,  1993): (i) what 
features  underlie  rent-producing  resources?  and 
(ii) how  is the resource-based view rooted in and 
related to established theories of  strategy? 
Resources  are defined as  ‘those (tangible  and 
intangible) assets  that  are  tied  semipermanently 
to  the  firm  (see  Caves,  1980).  Examples  of 
resources are:  brand  names,  in-house  knowledge 
of  technology, employment of  skilled  personnel, 
trade  contracts,  machinery,  efficient  procedures, 
capital,  etc.’  (Wernerfelt,  1984:  173).  Since 
resources are located or produced inside the firm, 
theories of  organizational behavior and  structure 
point to major sources of  sustainable competitive 
advantage (Powell, 1992). One of  the most influ- 
ential  lists  of  the  conditions that  underlie  sus- 
tainable competitive advantages was  provided by 
Barney  (1986a),  who  names  four  conditions: 
resources  derive  their  sustainable  competitive 
potential from  being  (i) valuable, (ii) rare,  (iii) 
imperfectly imitable and  (iv) imperfectly substi- 
tutable. These characteristics follow from a num- 
ber  of  underlying  mechanisms  such  as  unique 
historicity,  causal  ambiguity, social  complexity, 
tacit  knowledge, future uncertainty  and  variable 
rationality (Lippman and Rumelt,  1982; Barney, 
1986a,  1986b;  Dierickx  and  Cool,  1989;  and 
Schoemaker,  1990). The  key  argument  is  that 
factor  markets,  the  actual  or  imaginary  places 
where  resources  are  traded,  are  imperfect 
(Barney, 1986a; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 
1993) so that the associated resources operate as 
‘isolating mechanisms’  (Rumelt,  1984; Mahoney 
and  Pandian,  1992). That  is,  a  firm  is  able  to 
monopolize rent-producing resources without the 
immediate threat of  being outflanked, so retaining 
a sustainable competitive advantage. 
The  resource-based  theory  of  the  firm  com- 
plements  and  integrates  contributions from  many 
perspectives,  notably  industrial  organization  and 
transaction  cost  theory  (Connor,  1991;  Mahoney 
and  Pandian,  1992; Peteraf, 1993). With hindsight, 
the  resource-based  theory  of  the  firm  is  said  to 
encompass  well-established  theories  of  firms’ 
growth  and  profit,  implying  that  a  long  list  of 
classic  contributions  to  economic  and  strategy 
research-such  as  Ricardo  ( 18  17),  Schumpeter 
(1934), Penrose  (1959), Ansoff  (1965) and  And- 
rews  (1971)-can  be  claimed  to  reflect  resource- 
the resource-based view from industrial organization 
theory  is the  focal level of  analysis: the  resource- 
based  approach  emphasizes the firm  level,  where 
industrial organization theory focuses on  the indus- 
try  or  market.  The  resource-based  and  industrial 
organization  theories  are  Siamese  twins,  as  both 
factor and product market imperfections are crucial 
and both the firm  and the industry level of  analysis 
are important. Additionally, both  the  strategic man- 
agement  and  the  industrial organization  traditions 
deal with an  intermediate level of  aggregation: the 
(suategic) group (Caves and Porter,  1977; Gilbert, 
1989; Tallman,  1991; Cool  and  Dierickx,  1993). 
Combining the distinction between factor and  pro- 
duct markets with the distinction between the levels 
of  firm,  group and  industry produces  a  resource- 
based  theory  of  the Jim,  group  and  industry, or 
the  ‘resource-based theory  of  competitive advan- 
tage’  for short (Figure 1). 
The  key  concept  is  resources,  and  the  key 
question is which resources generate a sustainable 
rent  potential  at  the  level  of  the  firm,  group  or 
industry. This can  be  illustrated on  the basis of 
Barney’s  ( 1986a)  four  rent-producing  resource 
characteristics  and  Wemerfelt’s  (1984)  barrier 
concept.  To  have  a  rent-producing  potential,  a 
resource has to be valuable and scarce in the first 
place,  whatever the  level  of  analysis. This indi- 
cates  a  product  market  imperfection.  However, 
if  there  was  perfect  imitability  and/or  perfect 
substitutability, the  competitive advantage would 
not  be  sustainable. A  resource is  rent-producing 
at a$m level if the associated resource is imper- 
fectly imitable and substitutable by  all other firms. 
This resource reflects Wernerfelt’  s (resource) po- 
sitioning banier  (1984).  A  resource  produces  a 
rent at the level of  a strategic group  if  it cannot 
be  easily  imitated  or  substituted  by  competing 
firms outside the  group. This  resource underlies 
Caves  and  Porter’s  (1977)  mobility  barrier.  An 
industry  rent-producing  resource  is  difficult  to 
imitate or  substitute  by  outside firms  (potential 
entrants-be  they  new  or  from  (related  or 
unrelated) industries). This resource erects Bain’ s 
(1956) entry barrier. 
A  BRIEF HISTORY  OF THE DUTCH 
AUDIT INDUSTRY 
There  are  three  main  reasons  for  selecting  the 
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Figure2a.  The  Dutch audit  market  1880-1990.  Total number of  RAs in  public  practice 
based theory. Firstly, the audit industry is a well- 
defined market, since both the supply and demand 
side  can  be  identified  without  much  difficulty. 
There are no services offered outside this market 
that  can  easily  substitute for  audit  services. The 
demand  side of  the  audit  market,  in  an  unregu- 
lated  environment,  consists  mainly  of  (listed) 
companies, and  in  a regulated environment it  is 
defined  by  law.  Secondly,  the  audit  industry  is 
well  documented. Auditors’  professional organi- 
zations publish detailed information on  members, 
audit firms and rules of  conduct. Thirdly, after a 
long  period  without  any  substantial  regulation, 
about  three  decades  ago  extensive  regulations 
were established for the Dutch audit market. This 
is an  opportunity to study the effects of a change 
from a virtually unregulated market to an  exten- 
sively regulated market. 
Density and concentration 
The  Dutch  audit  industry  has  a  history  of  about 
110  years  (de Vries,  1985). The total  number of 
auditors in  public practice has  increased exponen- 
tially, to 2885 in  1990 (Maijoor et al., 1995). This 
is  clear  from  Figure 2a.  From  1967  to  1990, the 
classification of  auditors is perfect: one professional 
organization-NIvRA  (Nederlands  hstituut  van 
Register Accountants)-registered  all professionals 
with  a  legally  protected  ‘RA  licence’ (where RA 
denotes  Register  Accountant, with  the  Dutch  RA 
being  akin  to  the  American  CPA).  By  and  large, 
an  RA  can  either  be  in  public  practice-as  an 
employee or partner of  an audit firm-or  can  serve 
in  a  public  or  private  limited  liability  company 
(henceforth  denoted by  ‘public’ or  ‘private’ com- 
pany, respectively) or government body. Figure 2b 
reveals  the  number  of  audit  firms  (density), and 
Figure2c  the  market  share of  the  Big Four  firms 
(C,) over the  1880- 1990 period.’ 
Demand and supply regulation 
Until  1967,  there  was  hardly  any  regulation 
requiring firms to demand audit services, and also 
‘Two comments are  worth  making.  First,  the  C,  ratio  and 
the  Herfindahl-Hirschman  index  of  the  Dutch  audit  market 
have  very  similar  patterns  (Maijoor et  al..  1995). Second, 
audit  firm  size  is  measured  by  the  number  of  RAs,  which 
correlates almost perfectly  with alternative size proxies. Meu- 
wissen  (1992) calculates correlations above  0.97  with  both 
total fee income and audit fee income in  1986, 1988 and  1990. Resource-based Theory and the Dutch Audit Industry  553 
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Figure 2b.  Density  (number of  audit firms) 
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no  regulation  of  the  supply  side  of  the  market. 
A  number  of  professional  organizations offered 
memberships  to  practicing  auditors.  Between 
1967  and  1990,  four  key  regulatory  measures 
were  implemented (Frielink  and  de  Heer,  1985; 




The Law  on  Registered  Accountants  of  1967 
introduced  four  major  changes.  First,  the 
NIvRA  was  granted a  monopoly  to  organize 
the Dutch audit profession. Second, the NIvRA 
obtained the sole right to set disciplinary rules 
for RAs: if  the actions of  an RA are ‘harmful 
to  the  profession,’  a  number  of  disciplinary 
measures  can  be  taken-including  deletion 
from  the  register.  Third,  the  right  to  attest 
financial accounts was, with a few exceptions, 
limited  to  RAs.  Fourth, the  NIvRA  obtained 
a very  strong influence on the setting of  edu- 
cational  requirements for  qualification  as  an 
RA  as the major final examinations are under 
the control of  the NIvRA. 
Before the Act on Annual Accounts of  Compa- 
nies  of  1970  came  into  effect,  there  were 
only  prescriptions  for the  annual accounts of 
a particular group of public companies, namely 
‘open’  public  companies  (‘open  naamloze 
vennootschappen’  ).  Nearly  all  ‘open’  public 
companies  were  listed  on  the  Amsterdam 
Stock  Exchange.  They  accounted  for  only 
about 1.5  percent of  the total number of public 
companies.  The  pre- 1970  prescriptions 
included only instructions for the compilation 
of  the  asset  side  of  the  balance  sheet.  The 
1970  change  in  the  law  obliged  all  public 
companies, large private  companies and  large 
cooperative societies to disclose audited annual 
accounts-public  companies  and  cooperative 
societies  from  1971  and  private  companies 
from 1973. The disclosure requirements of  the 
annual  accounts  were  intensified,  with  pre- 
scriptions for both  sides of  the balance  sheet, 
the  profit  and  loss  account  and  the  explana- 
tory  notes. 
Four rules in the Professional  Code of  Regis- 
tered  Auditors  of  1972 may  dampen  compe- 
tition. First, advertising by  RAs was forbidden 
until  1987, and  is  permitted  after  1987 if  in 
accordance  with  ‘the  sense  of  good  taste.’ 
Second, offering unsolicited audit services and 
practicing low-balling are forbidden. Third, an 
audit  firm  is  required  to  inform  the  existing 
auditor of  a potential  new  client if  this client 
is planning to accept a switching offer. Fourth, 
an  RA  is  not  allowed to  provide a judgment 
on another RA  without hearing the latter. 
4.  Under  Title 8 of  Book  2 of  the  Civil  Code of 
1983 all  public companies, private companies 
and  cooperative societies are  obliged  to  dis- 
close  annual  accounts.  Small  and  medium- 
sized  firms  are  allowed  to  submit  abridged 
annual accounts. All  large and  medium-sized 
firms  are  required  to  have  their  annual 
accounts  audited.  As  a  temporary  provision, 
medium-sized firms could postpone obligatory 
auditing until  1989. The 1983 legislation con- 
tains detailed requirements for the  content of 
annual accounts with respect to (i) the infor- 
mation conveyed in the notes, (ii) the presen- 
tation  and  format  of  the  balance  sheet  and 
profit and  loss account, (iii) the measurement 
rules for profit  and  (iv) the creation and  dis- 
bursement of  the revaluation reserve. 
It should be  noted that the four regulatory meas- 
ures  can  be  grouped  into  demand  regulation 
(measures  2  and  4)  and  supply  regulation 
(measures  1 and  3). 
Lobbying for regulation 
Both  demand and  supply regulation are believed 
to  be  in  the  economic  interest  of  auditors. 
Demand  regulation  requires  companies  to  buy 
services  from  auditors,  and  supply  regulation 
restricts entry and limits competition (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986; Young,  1991). The dominant 
policy issue for Dutch auditors’ organizations has 
been  the  legal  protection  of  their  activities and 
an  audit  requirement  for  companies  (de  Vries, 
1985: Section 11-3).  For example, the minutes of 
NIvA,  by  far  the  largest  predecessor  of  the 
NIvRA, stated  that  ‘the organization will  act  in 
the  interest of  its  members.’  One of  the  means 
of  achieving this objective was ‘striving for legal 
regulation of  the profession.’ The NIvRA and  its 
predecessors  succeeded  in  participating  in  the 
acutal drafting of  financial accounting and audit- 
ing regulations. For example, Kraayenhof, one of 
the  founders  of  the  leading  Dutch  audit  firm 
KPMG, played a very important role in the com- 
mittee preparing the  1970 regulation. 
Economic theory recognizes that  private inter- 
est  groups  may  lobby  for  rent-producing inter- Resource-basea  ‘  ‘ Theory and the Dutch Audit Industry  555 
ventions  by  government  bodies  (Buchanan  and 
Tullock,  1965; Olson,  1965; StigIer,  197I). The 
key  argument  is  that  private  agents  can  pursue 
rent-seeking strategies that  aim  at exploiting the 
profit opportunities offered by  government inter- 
ventions  which  they  have  themselves prompted. 
A  case in  point is protection of  incumbent firms 
by  government intervention in the form of raising 
artificial  entry  barriers  (Ordover  and  Saloner, 
1989; Laffont  and Tirole,  1991), thus increasing 
potential  rivals’  costs  (Salop  and  Scheffman, 
1983). In  the  strategy literature, the  message is 
that firms may achieve (or protect) a competitive 
advantage  with  the  help  of  regulatory  agencies 
(Murray,  1978;  Reger,  Duhaime,  and  Stimpert, 
1992). Empirical studies on this issue are fruitful 
but  scarce (Reger et  al., 1992: 201). 
What  needs  to  be  explained  is  why  Dutch 
auditors were  so  successful in  the political  pro- 
cess. The group characterisics of  audit firms and 
client  firms  suggest  that  the  former  would  be 
expected to  be  more  successful in  shaping  the 
policy-making process than the latter. Four group 
characteristics  illustrate that  the  net  benefits  of 
lobbying activities of  audit finns are  high  com- 
pared  to client firms’ net benefits of  lobbying: 
Size  of  groups. Small groups are more  likely 
to lobby than large groups (Olson, 1965). The 
group  of  (large)  audit  firms  is  small,  which 
makes  it  easy  to  originate  collective  action 
(Lindahl,  1987).  Until  1989, the  number  of 
RAs  who  were  partners  in  an  audit firm  had 
never been  higher than  1295, many  of  whom 
worked  in  one  of  the  larger  audit firms.  At 
least  4602  client  firms were  affected  by  the 
1970 regulation requiring disclosure of  audited 
annual  accounts  (see  Figure 4a).  After  the 
implementation  of  the  1983  regulation  in 
1985-89,  up  to  140,000 client  firms  had  to 
disclose annual accounts (see Figure 4b). 
Consequences for  groups.  The  incentive  to 
lobby for a regulation  depends on  the magni- 
tude  of  the  expected  effects  for  individual 
wealth  (Downs,  1957). For  auditors the  dis- 
closure and auditing of accounting information 
concerns their main source of income (Sutton, 
1984). By  contrast, for client firms the  costs 
of  disclosing  audited  accounting information 
are only a minor category of  production costs. 
Two  studies with  Dutch  data  reveal  that  the 
costs  of  audit  fees  as  a  percentage  of  sales 
varies from  1.3  percent for very small compa- 
nies to 0.04 percent for larger companies (see 
Bollen,  1990). 
3:  Identification costs.  The  four  regulations are 
clear examples of  low  identification costs for 
‘winners’  and  high  identification  costs  for 
‘losers.’ The ‘winners,’ partners in public prac- 
tice, are relatively easy to identify. Intuitively, 
it  is  obvious  that  regulations  which  require 
more disclosure, more auditing and restrictive 
entry  to  the  profession  will  have  beneficial 
effects  for  individual auditors.  However, the 
identification of  ‘losers’ is  difficult. It  is not 
clear which  party  within the client firm actu- 
ally  pays  for  the  costs  of  these  regulations. 
Do  managers get  a  lower salary or  bonus  as 
a result of  these regulations, or are the regula- 
tory costs passed on  in  the prices of  the client 
firm’s products? 
4.  Representative  organizations.  Auditors  have 
been organized in professional associations for 
many  decades.  These  organizations  make  it 
possible to restrict the benefits of  lobbying to 
those  who  pay  for it. The  interests of  client 
firms  are  represented  by  a  large  number  of 
different  organizations, entailing  a  free-rider 
problem with respect to  lobbying efforts. 
REGULATION AND PROMOTION 
Human capital 
A key question is which resources are potentially 
rent-producing  in  the  (Dutch)  audit  industry. 
Since the  audit  industry  produces  a professional 
service, human capital is the prime candidate. In 
terms of  Wernerfelt (1984: 173) this reflects  ‘in- 
house  knowledge  of  technology’  (audit 
technology) and  ‘employment of  skilled person- 
nel’  (RAs). The importance of  human capital in 
the  audit  industry  can  hardly  be  overestimated. 
To qualify as an RA, one has to obtain knowledge 
of  complicated audit techniques (such as statisti- 
cal sampling, risk analysis and analytical review) 
and  extensive knowledge of  financial accounting 
(measurement  methods,  regulations  and 
standards).  During  the  years  covered  by  our 
study, the  nominal  duration  of  the  programs  to 
qualify  as  an  RA  was  about  6-8  years  after 
completing  high  school.  Applying  Barney’s 
( 1986a) four rent-producing conditions in combi- 556  S.  Maijoor and A. van Witteloostuijn 
nation  with  the  notion  of  (factor  and  product) 
market  imperfections (Figure 1 )  may  reveal  the 
competitive potential of this human capital in  the 
audit market. 
Product market: Value and scarcity 
The  first  conditions for  potential  rent  appropn- 
ation  is  product  market  imperfections:  the 
resource(  s) should  be  potentially  valuable  and 
scarce.  A  demand-side  imperfection  follows 
immediately from demand regulation. We predict 
that both the  1970 and  1983 financial accounting 
regulations have increased the forced demand for 
audit  services,  which  would  ceteris  paribus 
increase  the  value  and  scarcity  of  the  human 
capital resource of  RAs. Because more firms were 
subjected  to  a  disclosure  and  audit  requirement 
as  a  result  of  the  two  regulations,  we  expect 
demand for audit services to have  increased. As 
regards supply-side imperfections, a key issue is 
concentration. High  degrees of  concentration are 
a well-established manifestation of  product mar- 
ket imperfection. 
Hypothesis  1:  Following  the  implementation 
of  the  1970  and  1983  changes  in  jnancial 
accounting  regulation,  (a)  demand for  audit 
services  increased,  (b)  without  an 
accompanying fall  in  the  degrees  of  concen- 
tration. 
Hypothesis  l(a) is not  trivial as regulation may 
not  expand but  standardize existing practice (see 
Easterbrook  and  Fischel,  1984).  A  number  of 
companies  already  disclosed  audited  financial 
statements before the regulations, or audited their 
financial  statements  for  internal  management 
reasons. Also, there is evidence that many Dutch 
companies  avoided  the  regulation  by  changing 
legal  form,  or  by  simply  not  complying  with 
the  new  regulation. Hypothesis  1  involves three 
variables:  (i)  changes  in  financial  accounting 
regulation,  (ii) demand  for  audit  services,  and 
(iii) degrees of  concentration. It is easy to meas- 
ure  law  changes  (as  a  dummy) and  degrees of 
concentration  (concentration  indices  such  as  C4 
and Herfindahl-Hirschman).  There are two prox- 
ies for demand for audit services: first, the num- 
ber of  annual accounts disclosed by  public com- 
panies, private companies and  cooperatives; and, 
second, the number of  professionals (NIvRA stu- 
dents  and  RA  licensees)  in  audit  practice.  Of 
course, high  degrees of  concentration  alone are 
indicative  of,  but  not  sufficient  evidence  for, 
imperfect product market  competition. The  con- 
duct of  the players in  a limited-number setting is 
crucial. Firms in an oligopoly market may choose 
to  either compete or  cooperate  (Shapiro,  1989). 
Therefore, evidence on the RA  profession’s con- 
duct is also presented below. 
Factor market: Imperfectly imitable and 
substitutable 
A  second  prerequisite for  resources to  be  rent- 
producing is  that the factor  market is imperfect. 
At  the  level  of  the  audit  industry  this  implies 
that appropriately skilled labor-as  the key factor 
of  production-must  be  imperfectly mobile, and 
so  imperfectly  imitable  and  substitutable. It  is 
here  that  the  legally  enforced  regulation of  the 
supply  side  of  the  market  is  crucial.  First,  the 
law  prohibits  any  substitution, since  only  RAs 
were  allowed  to  provide  audit  services  during 
the period of  our study. Substitution by  adjacent 
professions,  such  as  bookkeepers,  was  insti- 
tutionally  blocked.  Second,  imitation  could  be 
regulated  by  the  professional  body  NIvRA  by 
opening and  closing  the  gates  to  the  RA  pro- 
fession. In  response to the increased demand for 
audit  services  the  profession,  through  the  then 
monopolist NIvRA, could restrict entry  into  the 
profession  in  order to  artificially sustain excess 
demand, which  would  permit  audit  firms  to  set 
high prices. However, as demand for auditing is 
legally  enforced, the  profession is  more  or  less 
obliged  to  supply  the  required  services or  face 
conflict with  the government and the judiciary. 
Hence, a more plausible strategy is not to limit 
entry into the profession. Audit firm partners, the 
owners  of  audit firms, need  employees to  carry 
out  the  increased  work  induced  by  regulations 
(Benston, 1985: 46-47).  Still, the established pro- 
fessionals could limit entry into the parrnerships 
of  large audit firms. In that way  the rent potential 
would be exploited by  a group within the indus- 
try:  large audit firms and their RA  partners. So, 
a  mobility  barrier is  complemented  with  a pro- 
motion barrier. A  promotion barrier protects the 
rent-appropriating capacity of  the  owners of  the 
firm. 
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in  the  demand  for  audit  services  afer  the 
implementation of  the  1970 and 1983 changes 
in financial accounting  regulation, the  ratio of 
RA  employees  plus  independent  RAs to  RA 
partners  increased. 
Hypothesis  2  requires  the  variable  ‘number  of 
auditors’  to  be  differentiated  according  to  the 
auditors’ status in  the firm. The data set enables 
us to distinguish between employees, independent 
practitioners and partners (all RA licensees). 
Rent  appropriation: Strategic groups and 
stratified promotion 
The argument  underlying  Hypothesis 2 assumes 
that  to  be  a  partner  of  a  large  audit  firm  is 
preferable to being  an  employee or  independent 
RA.  Since  conclusive  evidence  cannot  be 
obtained, due to lack of data, we  prefer to phrase 
our predictions on this issue as conjectures rather 
than hypotheses. 
Conjecture  I:  After  the  implementation  of 
the  1970  and  1983  regulations, RA partners 
were able  to appropriate  the  associated  rent. 
Additionally,  conventional  wisdom  in  the 
accounting literature suggests that  audit markets 
are  characterized  by  a  dual  market  smcture- 
with  a leading Big  Four, Big Five or Big  Eight 
versus a  large number of  small following firms. 
A  partnership  in,  say,  a  Big  Five  firm  is  con- 
sidered to be  arrival in  Walhalla. 
Conjecture 2:  The audit market  is  (a)  com- 
posed  of  two  groups,  a (relatively) attractive 
leading  segment  of  large  firms  and  a 
(relatively)  unattractive  follower niche of small 
firms,  and  (b)  the  composition of  the  leading 
segment  is stable  over time. 
Conjectures  1  and  2  relate  to  two  additional 
variables: (i) the income of  RA partners; and (ii) 
(changes in) the top ranking of audit firms. There 
are no data on profits, apart from limited partner 
income  figures  for  1961,  1966 and  1972.  The 
rankings  of  the  top  firms  for  14 years  in  the 
1964-90  period will be used to provide evidence 
on  Conjecture 2.  Basically, Conjectures 1 and 2, 
like Hypothesis 2, predict that a group within the 
industry-the  partners of  large audit firms-can 
exploit a  sustainable competitive advantage. The 
argument in  support of  this prediction comes in 
two steps. 
The first step is to argue that the audit market 
is  segmented.  Eichenseher  and  Danos  (1981) 
point  out  that  economies  of  scale  in  the  audit 
market  may  increase  for  two  reasons:  financial 
accounting regulation and client concentration. On 
the  one  hand,  increased  regulatory  complexity 
of  the  audit process  would require  a  substantial 
investment in expertise. Below a minimum level 
of  expertise,  probably  embodied  in  a  team  of 
RAs,  the  required  audit services cannot be  pro- 
vided.  In  the  Dutch  audit  industry,  the  law 
changes  in  1970 and  1983 have  indeed  compli- 
cated the required audit services. 
It could also be  argued that larger client com- 
panies can only be  serviced efficiently and with 
high  quality  by  large  audit  firms  (DeAngelo, 
1981; Benston, 1985). This follows not only from 
the  number  of  hours  that  have  to  be  put  into 
auditing several branches of  a large company, but 
also from the danger that an audit firm which is 
largely dependent upon a specific client could not 
resist  client  pressure  and  maintain  its  indepen- 
dence.  High independence indicates high  quality 
of  the  audit  firm.  Hence,  a  large  company- 
looking  for  high-quality  services-automatically 
demands services from a large audit firm. Increas- 
ing  client  concentration  as a  result  of  mergers 
and  acquisitions has  made this  mechanism even 
more  important. Mergers and  acquisitions result 
in  a  reduction of  the  number  of  clients and  an 
increase  of  the  average  client  size.  This clearly 
favors large audit firms. The resource-based the- 
ory  would  suggest  that  large  audit  firms  could 
also benefit from rent-producing group resources 
in  the  form  of  scale  economies  and  higher 
(perceived) quality. 
The  second  step in  the  argument  is  to  claim 
that  the large audit firm segment is more profit- 
able than the small firm niche. Three observations 
can  illustrate this  argument. First,  a  number  of 
studies report evidence that the  Big  Eight  firms 
charge  significantly higher audit fees than  firms 
in  the  non-Big  Eight  segment  in  the  U.S.A. 
(Palmrose,  1986)  and  Australia  (Francis  and 
Stokes, 1986). Second, anecdotal evidence on the 
claim  that  being  a  partner  of  a  large  firm  is 
attractive abounds: for example, Bhamornsiri and 
Guinn  (1991:  9) point  out  that  ‘[one]  of  the 
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choose public accounting as their career is to be 
admitted  as  a  partner  to  one  of  the  “Big  Six” 
firms.’ Third, in line with agency theory, evidence 
from  many  other  industries  indicates that  man- 
agers in  large companies receive  higher  salaries 
than those in smaller firms (Jensen and Murphy, 
1990; Lambert,  Larcker,  and  Weigelt,  1991). In 
professional service industries, a  low  partner-to- 
associate  ratio  is  said  to  indicate  high  partner 
incomes (see, for example, Nelson, 1981, on law 
firms).  Large professional service  firms  tend  to 
have lower partner-to-associate ratios. 
Summary 
Figure  3  summarizes  the  application  of  the 
resource-based theory to the Dutch audit industry 
in terms of  the framework of  Figure  1. 
The new  element in  Figure  3, promotion bar- 
rier,  applies the  resource-based argument to  the 
internal  organization by  referring to the isolating 
mechanisms  that  protect  the  rent-appropriating 
capacity  of  the  owners  of  the  firm.  Table  1 
summarizes the predictions of  the impact of  the 
two  changes  in  financial  accounting  legislation 
(in  1970 and  1983) on the key variables. 
The  next  section  reports  on an  empirical test 
of  Hypotheses  1  and  2,  and  tentative  evidence 
supporting Conjectures  1 and  2.  An  account of 
the  data  collection  and  measurement  issues  is 
contained in  the  Appendix.  Note  that  much  of 
the  data  set  is  not  a  sample:  in  terms  of  the 
number  and  size  of  firms  plus  the  number  of 
RAs the data set covers the complete Dutch audit 
market in the  1967-90  period.* 
EVIDENCE 
Hypothesis 1 
The first issue is the imperfection of the product 
market for audit services. Hypothesis l(a) states 
that  the  1970  and  1983  changes  in  financial 
accounting  legislation  are  expected  to  have 
increased the  demand  for  audit  services. A  first 
estimate of  this demand change is based on the 
number of  annual  accounts dis~losed.~  The esti- 
mates  for  the  total  number  of  disclosed  annual 
accounts are reported in  Figure 4. 
The total number of  disclosed annual accounts 
is estimated to have increased from 1671 in  1971 
to 4602 in  1973. It  should be  noted  that  annual 
accounts for the fiscal year  1970 are disclosed in 
1971.  The  results  indicate  that  demand  nearly 
tripled after the  1970 regulation came into effect 
in the fiscal years 1971-73.  From 1974 to 1980- 
a  period  without  a  material  change in  financial 
accounting regulation-the  estimated number of 
disclosed annual  accounts is about constant at  a 
level of  4000 per year. After the implementation 
of  the  1983 regulations, the estimated number of 
disclosed annual  accounts increased dramatically 
to 69,892 in  1987 and  161,602 in  1990. Hence, 
the data clearly confirm Hypothesis l(a). 
The  second  proxy  of  the  demand  for  audit 
services is the number of  professional employees 
in  public  practice  (NIvRA  students  plus  RA 
licensees). The expectation is that changes in  the 
number of  chargeable hours  traded  in  the  audit 
market would be reflected in the number of  pro- 
fessional employees in public practi~e.~  Table  2 
shows  the  estimates  of  annual  changes  in  the 
number  of  professional  employees  (aggregated 
and per category) for years affected by regulatory 
changes and for years unaffected by  changes. 
Years  in  which  a  change  in  the  size  of  the 
audit market  would be  expected because of  the 
1970 and  1983 changes in  legislation are classi- 
fied as ‘regulatory years.’ Four variant groupings 
(A-D)  of  regulatory  and  nonregulatory  years 
were  distinguished, because it  is difficult to pre- 
dict precisely which years will be affected by  the 
regulations.  Hypothesis  1  (a)  predicts  larger 
annual changes in market size in regulatory years. 
To  test  for a  significant difference in  the means 
in  the  nonregulatory  and  regulatory  periods,  a 
* This is achieved by  consulting the  (approximately) biannual 
membership lists of  the NIvRA, which implies that all RAs- 
including  the  audit  firm  they  are  affiliated  with-are  in  the 
data  set  (Maijoor er  al.,  1995). The  fact  that  data  are  used 
from  the  complete population  rather  than  a  sample  affects 
the  interpretation of the  results of the empirical tests. Signifi- 
cance only provides an  indication of the strength of  a relation- 
ship. A  lack  of  significance does  not  invalidate a  finding,  it 
only  indicates that  the  finding  is  not  strong. 
This measure does not take notice of  changes in the average 
number  of  chargeable  hours  per audit.  Since the  disclosure 
requirements have been intensified over time, this proxy  may 
underestimate the  increase in  the  demand  for  audit services. 
4This measure  ignores  changes  in  auditing  technology and 
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Table 1.  Hypotheses, conjectures, variables and predictions 




Law  change dummies (1970 and  1983) 
Dependent variables: 
Hl(a)  Number of  disclosed annual  accounts  + 
Number of professional employees  + 
Concentration  - 
H2  (RA employees + independent  RAs)/(large firm  RA  + 
partners) 
c1  Income of  RA partners  + 
c2  Number of  new firms at  the  top  - 
“A plus indicates an  (absolute or  relative) increase and  a minus  an  (absolute or  relative) decrease or 
status quo of  the  associated variable after the  implementation of  either law  change. 
permutation  test  (or  randomization  test)  was 
applied? 
The results for changes in the total number of 
employees and changes in the number of NIvRA 
students  clearly  support  Hypothesis  l(a).  The 
absence  of  significant  differences  in  terms  of 
the  number  of  RA  licensees  in  regulatory  and 
nonregulatory years  is  hardly  surprising, since a 
large pool  of  potential NIvRA  students is  ready 
to  enter the market, whilst a  6-  to  8-year study 
is needed  to  obtain  an  RA  license. NIvRA  stu- 
dents can be  recruited immediately from  a  very 
large group of  potential candidates (high  school 
graduates). That this group is used as a reservoir 
of  potential RAs is indicated by  the fact that, in 
the decade 1978-88,  the annual number of  newly 
registered  NIvFU  students  varied  between  429 
and  1152. 
Hypothesis  l(b)  predicts  that  the  observed 
increase in  the  demand for audit services is not 
associated with  a  fall  in  the  degree of  concen- 
tration.  Figure  2c  clearly  reveals  that  concen- 
tration has  increased dramatically (from a C,  of 
29.8 percent in  1968 to a C,  of  58.7  percent in 
1990), which suggests that imperfect competition 
rules  the  product  market.  This  observation  can 
be confirmed with reference to anecdotal evidence 
from  the  enforcement  of  NIvRA’s  Professional 
A permutation  test takes  into account the  fact that  the data 
are  ratio-scaled, and  so  is  in  this  case  more powerful  than 
the  Mann-Whitney  test  (which can  be considered  to  be a 
permutation  test applied to  ranks). 
Code  established  in  1972. The  NIvRA  operates 
a disciplinary committee that regularly publishes 
jurisdiction  on  the  basis  of  cases  against  RAs 
who have actually been accused of  and convicted 
for violating the Professional Code. An illuminat- 
ing example is Case  1990-14  (published in  the 
NIvRA,  ‘Jurisprudentie  tuchtrechtspraak:  1990- 
14’): an  RA  is  convicted  for  publishing  an  ad 
(in February 1987) in a local newspaper in which 
he  announced fees that are said to be  extremely 
low,  given  what  is  common  for  the  services 
involved. 
Hypothesis 2 
Imperfect product market competition is a neces- 
sary but not  sufficient condition for resources to 
have  a  sustainable  rent-producing  potential.  A 
second prerequisite is factor market imperfection. 
If  a demand  increase is  fully matched  by  entry 
by new suppliers of  audit services, the rent poten- 
tial would be competed away. In  the Dutch audit 
market, however, entry to  the profession  has  to 
occur  to  satisfy  the  legally  enforced  need  for 
audit services. What  can  be  done to protect  the 
rent  opportunities, however, is  to  regulate  entry 
into  partnerships  of  the  established  audit  firms. 
To analyze this process, RA  licensees in  public 
practice are divided into employees and partners. 
The  first  group  can  be  regarded  as  potential 
entrants  in  the  audit  market  as  RA  employees 
have  the  opportunity  to  supply  audit  services 
independently by  starting their own audit firm. 562  S. Maijoor and A. van Witteloostuijn 
Table 2. 
for regulatory and nonregulatory years" 
Regulatory  RAs  plus NIvRA  students  NIvRA students  RAs 
years 
Annual changes  in  the  number  of  professional  employees (aggregated  and per  category) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3) 
A.  1971  561.0  102.5  0.021*  509.0  39.4  0.016*  52.0  61.5  0.595 












C. 1971  329.6  87.9  0.066'  269.2  25.5  0.061'  60.4  60.6  0.452 
D. 1970  283.8  114.5  0.166  237.0  48.8  0.139  46.8  63.8  0.802 
(I) Average annual change in  regulatory years (number of  observations = 2  . . . 5). 
(2)  Average annual change in nonregulatory years (number of  observations = 15 .  . . 19).  -  .. 
(3)  One-Giiled p. 
"One  observation  for  NIvRA  students  is  missing  (1989).  The  annual  change  for  year  19xx  follows  from 
(i9xx+  i)-i9xx.  - 
*Significant at a  5%  level. 
+Significant at a  10%  level. 
Source: Maijoor (1994:  273-275) 
Because  supply-side  adjustment  can  be 
expected to  take a long  time,  as the RA  license 
is only obtained after 6- to  8-year study, it  was 
not  easy to  select a  nonregulatory period  and a 
regulatory period. If  the supply side of  the market 
does adjust, every year after the passing  of  new 
legislation may  have  been  affected. To compare 
the prechange period with the postchange era, the 
time series is traced backward to  1946. Panel A 
of  Table 3 provides the data for the nonregulatory 
(1946-70)  and  regulatory  (1971-89)  period  in 
terms of the average annual changes in the num- 
ber  of  RA  employees and  RA partners  in  pub- 
lic practice. 
The average annual change in the total number 
of  RAs is far greater in the  1971-89  period than 
in  the  1946-70  era.  A  Mann-Whitney  test  was 
applied to reveal significant differences, showing 
that  the  average  annual  change  is  significantly 
higher  in  the  regulatory  period.  The  result  is 
entirely  due  to  the  increased  numbers  of  RA 
employees in  the  1971-89  period.  In  fact,  the 
average  annual  change  in  the  number  of  RA 
partners is lower (though not  significantly so) in 
this regulatory period.6 
A  final  issue relating  to  Hypothesis 2  is  that 
it might be  expected that, if  the  position of  RA 
partner  in  an  established  audit  firm  (a  'coop- 
erating partner')  becomes more difficult to reach, 
the  number of  RAs  starting their  own  business 
(independent partners)  would  increase.  Panel  B 
6The data for the  first period  were  reanalyzed  to  check  for 
a trend  within the nonregulatory decades. A  comparison was 
made  of  the  average annual  changes  in the  total  number  of 
RA  employees and  RA  partners for  the  1946-57 and  1958- 
70 periods.  For  RA  employees, the mean difference was not 
significant  (the two-tailed  p  is  0.8704). However,  for  RA 
partners  the  1958-70  average  was  significantly  above  the 
average  change  in  the  1946-57 period (the  two-tailed p  is 
0.0387). In fact,  the  annual  changes  in the  1946-70 period 
can  be better proxied as  a constant annual percentage, rather 
than  as a constant absolute change. If  the  annual change for 
RA  partners  for  the  whole  1946-89 period  is  expressed  in 
percentages,  the  mean  for  the  regulatory era  is  significanrly 
lower than  the  mean  for  the  nonregulatory  decades.  Again, 
the  mean  differences  are  not  significantly different  (now  in 
terms  of  annual  percentages) for  the  1946-57 and  1958- 
70 periods. Resource-based Theory and the Dutch Audit Industry  563 
Table 3. 
Panel  A:  Average  annual  changes in  the  number of  RA  employees and  RA  partners  in  public 
practice  in  the  nonregulatory and regulatory  period 
RA  growth in  the  nonregulatory ( 1946- 1970) and  regulatory  ( 197 1 -  1989) period 
~  ~- 
1946-1970  1971- 1989 
Standard  Standard 
Average"  deviation  Averageb  deviation  Two-tailed p 
~  ~~ 
RA  employees  16.88  17.97  45.56  36.76  0.00  14' 
RA  partners  21.80  19.31  17.83  13.10  0.7960 
Total  38.68  13.45  63.39  38.09  0.0181' 
~ 
Panel  B: Average  annual  changes in  the  number  of  cooperating  and  independent  partners  in 
public  practice  in  the  nonregulatory and  regulatory period 
1946- 1970  197  1 -  1989 
Standard  Standard 
Averagea  deviation  Averageb  deviation  Two-tailed p 
Cooperating  23.88  18.56  10.56  18.79  0.0353' 
Independent  -2.09  16.82  7.28  9.74  0.0094' 
"Average annual  change in  nonregulatory years  (number of  observations = 25). 
bAverage annual change in  regulatary years (number of  observations = 18). 
*Significant at  a  1%  level. 
'Significant at  a 5% level. 
Source: Maijoor (I 95'4:  273-275) 
of  Table 3 reveals the  annual changes for coop- 
erating and independent partners in  the nonregu- 
latory  and  regulatory  period.  The  difference 
between the two groups of partners is striking. In 
the regulatory decades, the number of  cooperating 
partners decreased and the number of independent 
partners increased significantly. 
In sum, the results clearly support the predic- 
tion  that  the  total  number of  RAs has  adjusted 
to the increased demand, but that entry into part- 
nerships  has  been  limited.  The figures in  terms 
of the ratio (average annual change in the number 
of  RA employees)/(average annual change in the 
number of  RA partners) are particularly illuminat- 
ing: this ratio is 0.77 and 2.56  in the nonregula- 
tory and regulatory period, respectively. 
Conjectures 1-2 
A  final  question  involves  rent  appropriation: 
which party in the audit market benefits from the 
product and factor market imperfection? Conjec- 
tures  1 and 2 predict that the winning party is a 
stable  group of  large  audit  firms and  their  RA 
partners. However, the public audit profession has 
the  habit  of  not  revealing  profit  data.  Reliable 
figures on RA income are only available for RA 
partners in the years  1961, 1966 and  1972. From 
this we  construct income change figures for the 
1961-66  and  1966-72  periods,  where  the  first 
period  does  not  and  the  second  period  does 
include a demand-enhancing change in regulation. 
Panel A of  Table 4 shows the median income of 
RA partners (in Dutch guilders), and changes in 
their income. 
The  income  growth  is 50  percent  in  the  first 
period and 83 percent in the second. As a bench- 
mark, Panel  B  of  Table 4 reveals  1961-66  and 
1966-72  income  growth  figures  of  other  occu- 
pations. The RA partners have the lowest income 
increase  of  all  groups  in  the  first  period.  They 
are  far  behind  the  income  growth  of  similar 
highly educated professionals (e.g.,  dentists, law- 
yers,  and  pharmacists), However,  in  the  second 
period the case is radically different: RA partners 
reveal the second-highest income growth, and are 
very  close  to  the  average  income  increase  of 
comparable professionals. 
The  next  question  is  whether  being  an  RA 
partner  in  a  large  audit  firm  is  attractive.  Two 
pieces  of  evidence  are  relevant  in  this  context. 
First, turnover  data  suggest that  RAs  in  public 
practice  prefer  a  partnership  in  a  large  audit 
firm  to  any  alternative affiliation.  Maijoor  and 564  S. Maijoor and A. van Witteloostuijn 
Table4.  Income  of  RA  partners  and  other  occu- 
pations= 
Panel  A:  (Changes  of)  the  median  income  of  RA 
partners  in  1961,  1966 and  1972 
Median  Growth per  Growth per 
Year  income  period  Year 
50%  8.45% 
83%  10.55% 
1961  40.883 
1966  61.250 
1972  111.800 
Panel  B: Income  growth of  other occupations in the 
1961-1966  and  1966-1972  period 
Period  Occupation 
~~  ~ 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1961-66  59%  69%  67%  78%  79%  50% 
1966-72  78%  75%  76%  70%  84%  83% 
(  1) Earned  wage growth of  employees  in  manufacturing and 
(2)  Growth of regulated wages. 
(3)  Growth of regulated wages  in business. 
(4)  Growth  of regulated government wages. 
(5) Income  growth  of  professionals (excluding  RA  partners 
(6)  Income growth of  RA partners in public  practice. 
The income  figures are  not  corrected for  inflation. 
services. 
in  public practice). 
Meuwissen  (1993)  present  evidence  that  the 
mobility of  RAs in public practice is clearly asym- 
metric:  total  mobility  inside  the  Big  Eight  firm 
segment is low, whereas the reverse is true outside 
this  market  segment. Their  data also suggest that 
the  large  audit  firms apply  an  ‘up  or  out’  career 
policy. A large number of  the RAs who are forced 
to leave a large audit firm move to a smaller audit 
firm. Hence,  small firms can be  considered to  be 
a sanctuary for RAs who were not successful in a 
large  audit  firm.  Second,  the 
employee/independent/partner  data presented above 
reveal  that changes in  the  number of  partners lag 
behind the other two categories. As  stated earlier, 
for professional services, this ratio is considered to 
be  a  rough  estimate  of  the  profits  available  for 
partners, with lower ratios indicating greater profits.’ 
’  An  alternative explanation for  the  changing ratio is techno- 
logical change  in  the  production  of  audits. However,  this is 
not  a  likely  explanation because  most  technological changes 
in  the  past  two  decades-such  as  the  use  of  computers, 
risk analysis and statistical  sampling techniques-reduced  the 
amount of  simple clerical  work  and  should  have  resulted in 
an  increase in  the  ratio. 
To  conclude  this  argument  on  rent  appropri- 
ation, it is necessary to test the validity of  Conjec- 
ture  2  that  the  audit  market  has  a  stable  two- 
group structure. One indicator is that the stability 
of  the Big Five for audit firms, in terms of  size 
and market share, is striking. This is clear from 
Table 5. 
In  the  1967-90  period, a small and relatively 
constant group  of  five  firms  have  been  able  to 
dominate the market. The Big Five succeeded to 
increase  their  joint  market  share.  Although  the 
Big  Five  firms  regularly  change  position,  new- 
comers rarely intrude. The four major  mutations 
can be easily explained: in  1969 Moret and Lim- 
perg  merged,  in  1972 Frese & Hogeweg joined 
KPMG  Klynveld,  in  1988  a  large  number  of 
privatized municipal audit departments formed the 
new VB firm, and in 1989 van Dien merged with 
Coopers & Lybrand. 
It  is  standard  practice  in  audit  market 
research  to  differentiate  between  large  audit 
firms (Big Five  or Big Eight) and  small audit 
firms.  Many  studies have  indeed  revealed  that 
the  audit  industry  is  composed  of  two  sege- 
ments.  This  pattern  has  been  observed  in,  for 
example,  the  U.S.A.  (Danos  and  Eichenseher, 
1986),  Australia  (Francis  and  Stokes,  1986), 
Canada  (Zind  and  ZCghal,  1989),  the  U.K. 
(Moizer and Turley,  1989) and the Netherlands 
(Maijoor el al., 1995). 
Of  course,  the  evidence  is  partial  at  best. 
Specifically, the data are not directly related  to 
the  hypothesized  rent-producing  resources  of 
large  audit  firms:  scale  economies  and 
(perceived)  quality.  In  this  respect,  three 
additional  studies are worthy of  mention.  Lee- 
flang, Boxem, and van Dijk (1992) observe that 
the market  share of  the Big Four audit firms in 
the large (top 100) client segment is impressive 
indeed,  and  is  still  increasing  (from  82%  in 
1985 to 88% in  1989). Apparently,  large com- 
panies favor large audit firms. Moreover, Lang- 
endijk  (1  990) reveals  that large companies sel- 
dom  switch  from  one audit  firm  to the  other. 
The  rare  cases  of  switching  can  generally  be 
explained  by  institutional  changes  such  as 
acquisitions  or  mergers.  Finally,  Langendijk 
(1994) provides evidence that 97.76  percent of 
all  listed  companies  in  the  Netherlands  were 
audited by a Big Four audit firm in  1990 (1989 
mergers reduced the Big Five international audit 
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APPRAISAL 
This paper makes two contributions to the litera- 
ture  on  the  resource-based  theory  of  strategy. 
First, the paper develops a resource-based theory 
of  the  firm, group  and  industry.  Resources can 
be  rent-producing at  all three levels of  analysis, 
and  which  level  matters  most  depends  on  the 
specific  characteristics  of  the  case  being  con- 
sidered. At  any level of  analysis, both  the factor 
and product market must be imperfect if resources 
are  to  produce  sustainable  rents.  Second,  the 
paper  reports  the  results  of  an  empirical  test 
of  the  resource-based  theory  on  the  basis  of  a 
longitudinal data set from the Dutch audit market. 
The core predictions of the resource-based theory 
of  the group and  industry are confirmed. It was 
particularly  interesting to  observe  that  a  group 
within  the  industry-large  audit  firms  and  their 
RA  partners-were  able  to  appropriate the  rent 
from the key resource in the audit market: human 
capital embodied in RAs. This induced the intro- 
duction of  the concept of  the promotion barrier. 
The findings also have implications for the issue 
of  regulation.  The  RA  profession  protected  its 
rent  potential by  preserving  the  imperfection of 
the factor and product markets through regulating 
the demand and  supply sides of  the market.  So, 
this  paper  argues  that  such  strategic  regulation 
may  be  a  major  source of  sustainable competi- 
tive advantage. 
Of  course,  there  are  alternative  explanations 
for our results, such as (i) scale economies, (ii) 
switching costs  and  (iii) reputation. These three 
issues are undoubtedly important in understanding 
changes in the size and segmentation of  the audit 
industry as a whole from 1970 to 1990, and they 
have been mentioned, in passing, in our analysis. 
However, none of  these complementary elements 
is  able  to  explain  the  striking  increase  in  the 
nonpartner-to-partner  ratio  in  the  audit  industry 
in  the period under study. 
This paper’s key message is that empirical tests 
can  make  a  fruitful contribution to  explorations 
of  the applicability of  the resource-based theory. 
This  paper  is  only  a  first  step.  However,  it  is 
hoped that this analysis is sufficiently convincing 
to  show  that  the  key  concepts of  the  resource- 
based theory-the  conditions underlying the sus- 
tainable  rent-producing potential  of  resources- 
can be  usefully applied in  an  empirical study of 
an  industry. Longitudinal research  is particularly 
promising.  In  fact,  a  long-run  perspective  is 
necessary if  the resource-based theory’s emphasis 
on  the sustainability of  competitive advantage is 
to  be  tested.  Of  course,  a  combined  cross-sec- 
tional and longitudinal design would be extremely 
powerful, since  single-industry studies-such  as 
this paper’s focus on the Dutch audit industry- 
suffer from  a  lack of  generalizability  . Although 
this type of  research is time-consuming, it would 
be  worthwhile, because understanding what gen- 
erates sustainable competitive advantages is cru- 
cial in, if  not the hard core of, the strategy field. 
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APPENDIX 
Number of  disclosed annual accounts 
The  estimate of  the  number of  annual accounts 
disclosed  prior  to  the  1970 change in  financial 
accounting regulation is based on the number of 
companies  listed‘  on  the  Amsterdam  Stock 
Exchange in  1970. The  1970 fiscal year was the 
last  year  not  governed  by  the  new  regulations. 
Reports  for the  1970 fiscal  year  were  disclosed 
in  1971. Before the  1970 regulation, only  ‘open’ 
public  companies  were  subjected  to  financial 
accounting  regulation.  Nearly  all  ‘open’  public 
companies were  listed  on  the  Amsterdam  Stock 
Exchange,  and  about  85  percent  of  this  group 
audited  their  accounts  voluntarily  (Groeneveld, 
1965). The number of  listed public companies in 
1970 (692) is  therefore taken  as  an estimate of 
the maximum number of  audited annual accounts 
disclosed before the passing of  the  1970 Act. No 
data are  available on  the  number of  cooperative 
societies which disclosed audited annual accounts 
prior  to  the  1970 Act.  To estimate the  increase 
in the total number of  disclosed annual accounts, 
it  is  assumed that  the  passing  of  the  1970 Act 
did not reduce the number for cooperatives. Since 
1973,  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  has  reported 
the  number  of  firms  that  meet  the  disclosure 
requirement. 
Number of  RA students 
Two main groups of  professional employees can 
be  distinguished in  public practice:  RA  students 
and  RA  licensees.  Two  alternative  educational 
programs  are  available  for  RA  students:  the 
accountancy  program  conducted  by  the  NIvRA 
and  the  accountancy programs of  Dutch  univer- 
sities. NIvRA students study part-time while they 
are  employed by  an audit  firm.  University edu- 
cation  is, by  and large, full-time. Therefore, the 
number of RA students working in public practice 
is  proxied  by  the  number  of  part-time  NIvRA 
students. The  number of  NIvRA  students taking 
courses in any year is derived from the NIvRA’s 
annual reports. 
Concentration measures and top ranking 
Calculation of  the  C,  ratio  is  standard (Scherer 
and  Ross,  1990). The  data  on  the  number  and 
size of  audit firms are derived from membership 
lists of  the  NIvRA  and  its  preceding  organiza- Resource-based Theory and the Dutch Audit Industry  569 
tions, which are published approximately biannu- 
ally  (Maijoor  ef  al.,  1995). The  data  make  it 
possible to measure firm size for all audit firms, 
which  implies  that  the  top-ranking  firms,  their 
size and market shares can be  identified. 
Number of  RA employees and partners 
The number of  RAs in audit practice in  any year 
is  easily  derived  from  the  NIvRA  membership 
lists (Maijoor ef  al., 1995). The MvRA member- 
ship lists cover  the  whole  practicing RA  popu- 
lation  for  the  1967-90  period,  as  the  NIvRA 
register  includes  (by  law)  all  RAs  and  their 
affiliation. Data  from  the  1946-66  period  were 
collected by  consulting the NIvA  (Nederlandsch 
Instituut van Accountants) membership lists. The 
NIvA  was  the  largest  professional  organization 
of  RAs before the formation of  the NIvRA  mo- 
nopoly.  The  NIvA’s  members  account  for  81 
percent  of  new  entries in the NIvRA register in 
1967 and  1968. For  the  sake of  comparison the 
NIvA time series is adjusted upward  by  a  fixed 
percentage (23.13’76,  since  1.2313 x 81 = 100%). 
Income of  RA partners and other 
occupations 
Data on the average incomes of  RA partners and 
other professionals in  1961 and  1966 have been 
derived  from  two  reports  which  an  umbrella 
organization of professionals, the FOIB (Federatie 
Organisaties Intellectuele Beroepen), published in 
1964 and  1968. The data for  1972 are based on 
a  1981 report by  the CBS (Centraal Bureau voor 
de  Statistiek).  Income  figures  for  other  occu- 
pations are reported  in  a  number of  CBS publi- 
cations. 